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Recent studies of children’s tool innovation have revealed that there is variation
in children’s success in middle-childhood. In two individual differences
studies, we sought to identify personal characteristics that might predict suc-
cess on an innovation task. In Study 1, we found that although measures of
divergent thinking were related to each other they did not predict innovation
success. In Study 2, we measured executive functioning including: inhibition,
working memory, attentional flexibility and ill-structured problem-solving.
None of these measures predicted innovation, but, innovation was predicted
by children’s performance on a receptive vocabulary scale that may function
as a proxy for general intelligence. We did not find evidence that children’s
innovation was predicted by specific personal characteristics.1. Introduction
Cultural modification is a two-stage process. First, a novel idea must emerge (inno-
vation). Second, it must be transmitted through the group (cultural transmission).
In this paper, we are concerned with the question of how novel ideas arise in indi-
viduals and specifically whether some individuals are more likely to come up with
innovations than others. Although some innovations will come about by chance or
uninformed trial and error, this paper will focus on the cognitive processes that
may underpin purposeful attempts at innovative problem-solving.
One possibility is that there are unusual individuals who solve problems
beyond the reach of the vast majority of their peers. For example, research
with non-human species often describes behaviour by one individual in a
population: Betty the crow, who made a hook tool to fish a bucket from a
tall tube [1]; Imo, the macaque, who washed sweet potatoes [2]; Mike, the chim-
panzee, who banged cans together to make a threatening display [3]. Similarly,
we can identify a few humans who are thought of as particularly prolific or rad-
ical innovators, such as Steve Jobs or Thomas Edison. Given the rarity both of
individuals and instances of innovative behaviour, it is difficult to infer the gen-
eral characteristics of innovators from these unusual cases. Furthermore, the
characteristics of these unusual innovators may not be the same characteristics
as underpin less dramatic innovations in the general population of a species.
Thus, we can also look for innovation ability across more typical members of a
population. As the tendency to innovate seems to varywithin groups, we can try to
identify the characteristics that promote this behaviour. This approach leads
researchers to look across groups of individuals, present themwith innovation chal-
lenges, and hope to identify characteristics of those who innovate. Laland and
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vidual guppies who have innovated once are more likely than
others to do so again [4]. Laland and Reader identify two
levels at which these characteristics are found: state-dependent
factors and personality traits. cietypublishing.org
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State-dependent factors1 identify classes of individuals within
a population and include characteristics such as sex and
age. In guppies, innovators are more likely to be female
than male. Laland and Reader attribute this finding to the
fact that females have unconstrained growth (unlike males
who stop growing at maturity) and are larger, arguing that
female fish are more likely to benefit from innovations
when foraging (see discussion [5]). Evidence from non-
human primates suggests that age, another state-dependent
factor, may influence innovation: there are some reports of
more innovations by adults [6], but others identify a high
number of innovations in youngsters (e.g. [7]). Social status
may also be important: in chimpanzees subordinate individ-
uals are more likely to be recorded as innovators than
dominant [6]. In recent studies with humans where individ-
uals had to innovate solutions to simple physical problems,
older children perform better than younger [8,9] and adults
typically solve these tasks with ease [8].
Personality traits are also potential explanations for individ-
ual differences in innovative behaviour. The biologists’ use of
this term goes beyond the dispositions that psychologists might
traditionally thinkof aspersonalityby including cognitive abilities
and motivational tendencies. Here, we will call them personal
characteristics to bridge the fields [10]. Some personal character-
istics have been identified aspredictors of innovation success. For
example, spotted hyenaswho showmore diverse initial explora-
tory behaviour and less neophobia are more likely to innovate
and solve a problem [11]. The same characteristics also predict
innovation in Carib grackles (Quiscalus lugubris, a New World
member of the passerine family [12]). In this study, the personal
characteristics measures were not taken in the problem-solving
task used to measure innovation. For example, a neophobia
scorewasgivenby the lengthof time it took abird to start feeding
after a novel object had been introduced into the cage. Finding
relationships between innovation and measures taken out of
this context adds weight to the idea that general personal
characteristics are involved in innovation.
Research with human adults offers some suggestions for
personal characteristics that may be associated with inno-
vation. Social psychological studies (e.g. [13]) have examined
the characteristics associated with particular groups of creative
people (e.g. artists versus non-artists) and found that the more
creative samples scored more highly on characteristics such as
openness and impulsivity among others (these two character-
istics are particularly interesting because of the resonance
with the non-human literature). Simonton [10] emphasizes
that personal characteristics such as non-conformity and risk
taking (alongwith openness and others) interactwith cognitive
processes, lifespan development (an individual’s experiences
throughout their life) and social context to produce innovators.
Recent work that we describe in more detail below shows
that children’s ability to innovate solutions to problems
improves with age. However, another state-dependent factor,
gender, does not differentiate performance in any of these
studies. With regard to personal characteristics, we have yet toexplore whether these predict children’s innovative ability.
This is the focus of this paper. Outside the realm of innovation,
there are several domains in which children’s personal charac-
teristics seem to explain their abilities. For example, one can
predict which children will pass a false belief task based on
their performance on inhibitory control measures [14]. Individ-
ual differences studies have also suggested that in order for
children to experience regret (something that emerges around
6 or 7 years) children need to develop advanced attentional
flexibility powers [15]. Recent work indicates that children
with better working memory are better liars (indicating
more advanced cognitive ability [16]). Investigating individual
differences during childhood reminds us that the skills needed
to acquire and deploy abilities as a novice may well be different
from those required by the mature system. For example, while
language seems to play a critical role in children’s acquisition
of theory of mind abilities, severe damage to language abilities
in adulthood leaves the same theory of mind reasoning appar-
ently intact [17]. The personal characteristics that may explain
the emerging ability to innovate in young children may be
different from those that underpin innovation in adults.(b) Problem-solving studies
To identify personal characteristics that underpin innovation
ability in children, wewill exploit recent findings that identified
children’s surprising difficulty with innovation in physical pro-
blem-solving tasks. These studies are based on a task from the
non-human literature in which birds made novel hook tools to
retrieve an otherwise unreachable item (see [1,18,19]).
In the child version of the task, participants are presented
with a tall, transparent tube at the bottom of which is a bucket
containing a desirable sticker. Various materials are offered to
help the child retrieve the bucket, some of which can be used to
fashion ahook tool. Inmost studies, children have been givenpli-
ablepipecleaners tobend [8], althoughsometimespiecesofwood
have been used [20]. Children find the hook-innovation task
rather difficult to solve. Three- to four-year-olds almost all fail,
and it is not until around the age of 8 years that the majority of
children succeed in innovating a suitable tool. Between 5 and 8
years of age around half of the children solve the task [8].
Subsequent studies have confirmed the finding and ruled
out some alternative explanations for children’s difficulties,
suggesting that the tool-making paradigm is an interesting
one to investigate the development of innovation. Children’s
difficulties are not simply the result of a pragmatic misunder-
standing that the materials should not be manipulated:
performance remained poor when they were directed to
‘make something’ with the materials [21] and after they had
the chance to manipulate the materials in a familiarization
phase [8]. This latter evidence also shows that children fail the
task evenwhen they have just seen that pipecleaners are pliable.
Children appear to know that the hook tool is a suitable solution
to the problem: if given a choice between a straight pipecleaner
and a premade hook children as young as 4 choose the hook to
retrieve the bucket, and if children are shown how tomake (but
not use) a hook by a demonstrator they rapidly make their own
tool and spontaneously use it successfully [8].
The studies described, thus far, have been conducted with
children from one WEIRD cultural group [22]. However,
Neilsen et al. [23] found very similar levels of (lack of) success
in 3–5-year-old South African Bushman children (and urban
Australians). The Bushman children were of particular
rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org
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reliance on direct instruction in learning and greater exposure
to needing to make artifacts that are played with’ (p. 386).
Despite this difference in environment and experience, the
Bushman children’s performance was no different from the
urban Australians’, and indeed, none of the 24 Bushman
participants innovated a hook tool from a straight pipecleaner.
Furthermore, children’s difficulties with innovation are not
limited to the bucket retrieval/hook task—they extend to other
problems. Children struggle (although to a lesser extent) to
unbend a pipecleaner making a long straight tool that can
push a ball from a horizontal tube [21]. They also have diffi-
culty with tasks that involve flattening a sheet of pliable
material and (separately) removing a stick from a piece of card-
board in each case to make a ‘shelf’ that helped to solve a
puzzle [20]. Tennie et al. [24] gave children the task of pulling
an out-of-reach platform towards them. The platform had a
screw protruding from it and the solution was to bend a thin
strip of pliable wood (‘wooden wool’) and loop it over the
screw. None of the 4-year-olds tested spontaneously produced
a loop. Hanus et al. [9] gave children a different innovation pro-
blem in which they could usewater to float a peanut to the top
of a tube. Testing children across a range of ages from 4 to 8
years, the levels of success reported are remarkably similar to
those seen on the hook-making task: only 9% of 4-year-olds
retrieved the peanut, whereas 42% of 6-year-olds and 58% of
8-year-olds solved the task. It is notable that in the middle-
childhood age range (6- and 8-year-olds) around half of the
children solved the task. As in the hook-making task, there
was substantial individual variation in performance within
these age groups. A similar lack of innovative use of the
water as a tool by 4-year-olds was reported by Nielsen [25].
We, and others including [26,27], have tended to interpret
these findings as showing simply that tool innovation is challen-
ging for young children and that majority success emerges
remarkably late (around 8 years old). However, this does not
truly exploit the developmental trajectory in the data. We have
most evidence from the hook-innovation task and on closer
inspectionwe see that between the phases of near floorperform-
ance in the under 5 s and near ceiling performance in the over
8 s, there is an extended periodwhere performance is very vari-
able. In the published samples of 5–8-year-olds, levels of
success typically range arounda third and a half of children suc-
ceeding. In the original Beck et al. study ([8], Experiment 2), it is
particularly striking that there is an extended plateau of partial
success by three age groups: 5–6, 6–7 and 7–8 year olds. Who
are the children who pass and who fail? In this paper, we
attempt to address this and present two individual differences
studies in which we compared children’s performance on the
hook-making task to other personal characteristics that show
variation in young children, in the hope of identifying the
characteristics possessed by successful innovators.2. Study 1: divergent thinking
In order to solve the hook-innovation task, one might imagine
that children are required to think creatively and flexibly about
the materials available to them and how to transform these into
a solution. Divergent thinking describes the thinking process of
generating multiple ideas and solutions. This is typically con-
trasted with convergent thinking, whereby a single correct
solution is focused upon [28]. We speculated that, in order togenerate an innovative solution to the hook task, children
needed to think divergently about the materials available. Thus,
we compared children’s performance on the innovation task
with measures of divergent thinking suitable for this age group.
In his structure of intellect model, Guilford [28] implicated
fluency, flexibility and originality in divergent thinking. Simi-
larly, Torrance [29] believed that those capable of producing
lots of ideas during fluency tasks were more likely to think
creatively than those who produce fewer ideas. In fluency
tasks an individual has to come up with multiple possible
ideas on a topic. For example, in the FAS, a verbal fluency
task, participants are required to produce as many words as
possible, beginning with one of the letters F, A or S, within a
specified time [30]. We predicted that children who scored
highly on measures of fluency, and thus could generate
larger numbers of ideas and solutions, would also be more
likely to perform well on tool-innovation tasks.
We presented children with two fluency tasks to measure
divergent thinking. The first was similar to a measure used in
the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking [31] and involved chil-
dren drawing as many different pictures as they could each
based on a circle template. The second measure was used by
Defeyter et al. [32] in their studies of functional fluency. Children
have to suggest multiple uses for objects. This second fluency
task involved thinking about objects and we were interested to
see whether this might reveal a domain-specific relation with
the tool-innovation task: i.e. that being able to think flexibly
about objects would result in high levels of performance on
both the object fluency task and the hook-innovation task. A
second hypothesis was that performance on the object fluency
task would be more strongly related to the hook-innovation
task than the circles task.3. Method
(a) Participants
The final sample consisted of 40 participants aged 5–7 years (20
boys), mean age 6 years 5 months (6;5) (range 5;5–7;4) from a pri-
mary school in the West Midlands, UK. One further child was
tested but excluded from analysis because he had overseen
another child complete the hook-making task.
(b) Procedure
Children were tested individually in one session by two female
experimenters (CW and an assistant). The session lasted
around 15–20 min and took place in a quiet space outside their
school classroom. Children completed a short battery of tasks
in a fixed order: circles task, hooks task, object uses task.
(c) Circles task
Childrenwere presentedwith a 21 cm  30 cmpiece of paperwith a
series of blank circles on it and a pencil. Two of the circles at the top
of the page had already been used to draw a pig and a clock. Chil-
dren were told ‘See these circles [points]. You can use them tomake
different drawings’. Their attention was then directed to the pre-
drawn pictures and they were asked ‘Can you make as many
different drawings as you can?’ Children were given 2 min to com-
plete the task. As a child began drawing on a new circle, they were
asked ‘What is this picture going to be?’ and the answer was noted
by the experimenter. Neutral prompts were given by the exper-
imenter where a child ceased to draw for 10 s or more, e.g. ‘Can
you do any more drawings?’ After 2 min, children were praised
and given a sticker and progressed to the next task.
Table 1. Binary logistic regression predicting success on hook-innovation task from divergent thinking measures.
predictor B s.e. Wald d.f. p-value odds ratio
age 0.06 0.05 1.47 1 0.229 1.07
gender 20.81 0.70 1.37 1 0.243 0.44
circles ﬂuency 20.24 0.27 0.80 1 0.371 0.78
object uses ﬂuency 0.12 0.11 1.17 1 0.279 1.125
rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org
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pictures drawn (excluding any duplications/replications). Cat-
egories of pictures were identified by two of the authors by
reviewing the all the items drawn and identifying where there
were common categories (i.e. where there were many similar pic-
tures). This process was subjective (but see §4 for the similarity
between analyses by items and by categories). These categories
were: animals, people (where a whole person was drawn, includ-
ing body), faces (including ‘face’, ‘head’ and other people, e.g.
‘me’ where only the face was drawn) and balls (e.g. ‘football’,
‘beach ball’). Any object drawn that did not fall into these cat-
egories was classed as being in a unique category of its own
e.g. ‘wheel’, ‘pizza’. Pictures were then assigned to categories
by one author (C.W.) and another coder (not blind). Agreement
was 100%.
(d) Hook-innovation task
Children were presented with the hook-innovation task based on
Beck et al. [8] (Experiment 3). We included a familiarization
phase in which the experimenter and child bent pipecleaners
around a pen, in order to highlight the physical properties of
the pipecleaner. In the main task, the experimenter showed
the child the bucket containing a sticker at the bottom of the
tall transparent tube and said that if s/he could get the sticker,
s/he could keep it. A sole pipecleaner was made available to
the child. The experimenter gave neutral prompts to encourage
the child to attempt the task. If a child failed to solve the task
after a minute, then the experimenter showed him/her how to
make a hook (tool manufacture demonstration), after which the
child had a further chance to retrieve the bucket.
Coding. Children were classed as passing or failing the hook-
innovation task based on whether they retrieved the bucket
using a hook in the first minute of the task.
(e) Object uses task
Children completed a ‘functional fluency task’ based on Defeyter
et al. [32]. Children were presented with two trials in a fixed
order: first brick, then blanket. On each trial, children were
shown the picture of the object, told its name and asked to generate
as many different uses for the object as they could. The exper-
imenter said ‘See this brick/blanket (pointed to picture). Think
about the different things you can do with it. Tell me as many
different things as you can’. Children were given a minute to list
as many uses as possible. Then the picture was removed and
they proceeded to the next trial.
Coding. One author (C.W.) and a blind-coder coded children’s
responses as suggestions (i.e. things that could be done with the
object, including design and novel functions. See the electronic
supplementary material). Comments that were merely descriptive
and did not involve acting upon the object, e.g. ‘it is heavy’, ‘it is
soft’ were excluded from analysis. Inter-coder agreement was
80% and disagreements were resolved by a third person. N.B.
Unlike Defeyter et al. [32], we included suggestions that did not
have a clear goal in our total because we were interested in
divergent thinking, rather than functional fixedness.Suggestions were then grouped into categories. Categories
were identified (by C.W. and blind-coder independently) based
on the children’s responses and identifying where there were
common categories (i.e. where suggestions shared a theme). This
process was subjective (but see §4 for the similarity between ana-
lyses by items and by categories). For example, any suggested
use of a brick for building/construction purposes, e.g. ‘build a
tower’, ‘make a factory’, was assigned to the ‘building’ category.
Any item not fitting into the defined categories was treated as
belonging to a unique category of its own. Inter-rater agreement
was good (94% for blanket categories and 100% for brick
categories). Disagreements were resolved by a third person.4. Results and discussion
(a) Gender differences
We looked for gender differences using t-tests on parametric
measures (age, total circles, circles categories, total object
suggestions, object categories) and using a x2-test on the categ-
orical variable of whether children successfully retrieved the
bucket. There was a borderline effect of gender on circles
categories: boys drew pictures from a larger number of cat-
egories (M ¼ 3.00, s.d. ¼ 1.34) than girls (M ¼ 2.25, s.d.¼
1.02, t38 ¼ 1.994, p ¼ 0.053). Therewere no other effects (results
closest to significance were total circles, t38 ¼ 1.332, p ¼ 0.191
(boys M ¼ 3.85, s.d. ¼ 1.53; girls M ¼ 3.30, s.d. ¼ 1.03) and
total object suggestions, t38 ¼ 1.333, p ¼ 0.191 (boys M ¼
10.70, s.d. ¼ 3.91; girls M ¼ 9.20, s.d. ¼ 3.17)).
(b) Hook-innovation task
Success on the task was defined as making a hook and
retrieving the bucket from the tube. Nineteen children
(47.5%) succeeded on the task. Two children made a hook
on the test trial but failed to succeed in retrieving the
bucket from the tube. No child failed to make a hook after
the tool manufacture demonstration.
(c) Divergent thinking tasks
Descriptive statistics for the divergent thinking tasks and
analysis of performance are in the electronic supplementary
material.
(d) Individual differences analysis
We conducted a binary logistic regression to predict success
or failure on the hook-innovation task. The following
measures were entered in to the analysis: Age (in months),
gender, total number of different pictures (circles task) and
total suggestions score (object uses task). None of these
measures was a significant predictor of performance on the
hook-innovation task (table 1) and the model appeared to
rstb.royalsocietypublis
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predicted 73% of those who failed the task, but 56% of those
who passed.2
There was no evidence that children’s innovation success
was related to their divergent thinking as measured by the
fluency tasks. In Study 2, we turned to a different set of cog-
nitive abilities that we reasoned may predict the development
of innovation: executive functions. hing.org
Phil.Trans.R.Soc.B
371:201501905. Study 2: executive function
Executive functions are the control processes that are
involved in goal-directed actions. As a complex behaviour,
it is implausible that tool innovation does not make demands
on executive function. Children need to organize their strat-
egies, keep track of what works and switch strategies when
necessary. However, we do not know whether differences
in executive function are responsible for some children
successfully innovating.
Developmentalists tend to think of the executive system as
beingmade up of three dissociated but connected components:
inhibitory control, working memory and attentional flexibility
[34,35]. Broadly speaking, inhibitory control refers to the ability
to stop what one is doing, often characterized as the ability to
overcome a prepotent response. Inhibitory control develops
markedly between the ages of 3 and 5 years [34], and continues
to develop through childhood into adulthood [36]. Working
memory is the ability to monitor incoming information and
code it according to its relevance for the task at hand. Atten-
tional flexibility refers to the ability to switch between
different tasks or operations [37]. In simple terms, task switch-
ing requires disengagement with a current but now irrelevant
task, and re-engagement with a new relevant task [35]. Chil-
dren’s task switching ability improves dramatically between
the ages of 3 and 5 [34], with further advances between the
ages of 5 and 11 [38].
As we mentioned earlier, analysis of the tool-innovation
task suggests that it must make demands on executive func-
tion. When given a tool-innovation problem children must
hold in mind the rules of the task and the different com-
ponents of information. As they engage with the task they
must update their knowledge based on feedback and coordi-
nate this knowledge into a useful solution. These activities
will tax working memory. fMRI studies with adults have sep-
arately indicated that working memory may be important for
tool-using actions [38]. Children must use their inhibitory
control to suppress irrelevant actions. They must also be
able to stop what they are doing if their current strategy is
unsuccessful. Finally, children must be able to switch
between different strategies. If their current strategy is unsuc-
cessful, children must disengage with the task and re-engage
using a new more efficient strategy. Based on this, it seems
likely that successful tool innovation in 5- to 8-year-olds
may be explained by advances in executive function.
We also considered anotherwayof thinking about executive
function that may be relevant to tool innovation: ill-structured
problem-solving. The distinction between well-structured and
ill-structured problems was first made by Reitman [39]. Reit-
man defined problems in terms of their start state, goal state
and the transformation required to go between the two. If infor-
mation regarding all three of these components was present,
problems were regarded as being well-structured. Ifinformation was missing from one or more of the components,
Reitman defined the problem as being ill-structured.
Research on ill-structured problems arose from obser-
vations of neuropsychological patients. Some patients have
been observed to perform at normal levels in tests given to
them by experimenters, yet these same patients had difficulty
in carrying out every-day simple tasks such as cooking a
meal or doing the shopping [40–42]. Based on these peculiar
findings, Shallice & Burgess [43] devised new ill-structured
tasks that were more closely related to everyday scenarios
and required multi-tasking and prospective memory. One
task, the Multiple Errands Test, took place in a shopping
centre and required patients to retrieve items and information
listed for them while following simple rules such as only
being able to enter each shop once, and only entering a
shop if they purchased something. A laboratory-based ver-
sion, the Six Elements Test, required patients to complete
six tasks of three sub-types while following a set of rules
such as not completing two parts of the same sub-type in a
row. Shallice and Burgess found that their clinical patients
performed comparatively worse on these ill-structured tasks
than age- and IQ-matched controls, despite performing at simi-
lar levels on traditional executive measures. Researchers
concluded that the difficulty of these ill-structured tasks lies
in the fact that they require multiple executive functions as
described above, yet do not simply reduce to the sum of their
parts. Recently, Cutting et al. [44] described experimental find-
ings indicating that children had difficulties coordinating
information needed to make a novel tool, and interpreted this
as suggesting that tool innovation fits the definition of an ill-
structured problem. The start and goal states are well defined,
but there is information missing about the transformation
required to go between the two. In Study 2, we used the Six
Parts Test, ameasure of ill-structuredproblem-solving designed
for children [45] in the hope of identifying a relationship
between innovation and ill-structured problem-solving.
Note that in a pair of recent studies experimental manipu-
lations of one element of executive function, inhibition, were
deployed in the hope of improving children’s performance
[46]. Children were made to delay before attempting to solve
the task (delay manipulations have improved children’s per-
formance on reasoning tasks that make high inhibitory
demands, e.g. [47,48]) and in a separate study they were
prompted to switch strategies at regular intervals in case a
lack of inhibitory control was leading to perseveration. Neither
of these specific inhibitory manipulations improved children’s
performance. However, we reasoned that it remained impor-
tant to explore a wider range of executive abilities and also
that an individual differences approach may yet yield positive
results even if it was not possible to manipulate the inhibitory
demands in the tool-innovation task. Overall, we predicted that
success on the tool-innovation task would be forecast by
performance on executive function measures, especially
ill-structured problem-solving.6. Method
(a) Participants
The final sample consisted of 43 participants aged 6–8 years
(25 boys), mean age 7 years 6 months (7;6), range 6;8–8;5, from
a primary school in South Birmingham, UK. One child’s data
were excluded because English was not his first language,
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children did not complete the second testing session.
(b) Design
Children were tested individually in two sessions by the same
experimenter (N.C.). Each session lasted around 15–20 min.
The two sessions were administered to children at least 3 days
apart and a maximum of 14 days apart. In the first session, par-
ticipants completed the Six Parts Test from the Behavioural
Assessment for Dysexecutive Syndrome for Children (BADS-C)
battery [45] and then the British Picture Vocabulary Scale-II
(BPVS-II [49]). In the second session, children were given the
hook-innovation task and the executive function tasks in a
fixed order: Hooks task [8], simple inhibition (‘the pictures
task’, adapted from Davidson et al. [33]), working memory (a
counting recall task based on Alloway et al. [50]) and, finally, a
task of complex inhibition and task switching (‘the eyes task’,
an adaptation of the arrows task from Davidson et al. [33]).
(c) Materials and Procedure
(i) Six Parts Test
The Six Parts Test is a subtest from the BADS-C battery [45]. The
test comprises three types of task that each has two versions. The
green ‘How Many?’ tasks required children to turn over cards to
reveal a number of pictures, count the number of pictures and
write the total on a piece of paper. The blue ‘What is it?’ tasks
required children to turn over cards to reveal pictures, identify
the picture and write the name on the paper. All names con-
tained three to five letters; children were aided with spelling if
required. The red ‘Sort me’ tasks consisted of two boxes, one con-
taining multiple types of beads, the other containing nuts and
bolts. The lids of the boxes contained a picture, and children
were required to find the relevant beads or nuts from the
boxes that matched the picture and put them in the lids. Children
were given instructions as to how to carry out each task and were
told they had 5 min to complete as much as they could of each of
the six tasks. It was emphasized that they would not be able to
complete all of the tasks because they did not have enough
time. Additionally, children were given two rules to follow:
(i) they must complete a little bit of every single task during
the 5 min; (ii) they could not do two types of the same task in
a row, e.g. if children were working on the first ‘How many?’
task they could not move on to work on the second ‘How
many?’ task next, they must switch to work on one of the
‘What is it?’ or ‘Sort me’ tasks. Children were given 5 min to
engage with the test and a timer was in view so that they
could check their progress.
Coding. Children received an overall score out of 16 for the
Six Parts Test, based on the standard scoring strategy: children
were awarded two marks for each subtask they attempted (maxi-
mum of 12 marks). One mark was deducted for any rule breaks
on each of the three types of tasks (up to a maximum of three
marks). Marks were added or deducted based on the strategies
children used. If children used a clear pattern of responses to
avoid breaking the order rule they were awarded two marks,
for example, Green 1, Blue 1, Red 1, Green 2, Blue 2, Red 2. If chil-
dren had a clear strategy for trying to attempt all six parts they
were awarded an additional two marks; examples of strategies
include undertaking a set number of items on each subtest
before switching, or attempting a task for a set amount of time,
or a combination of both of these. Children had one mark
deducted if they returned to any part three or more times.
(ii) British Picture Vocabulary Scale-II
We included a measure of receptive vocabulary alongside our
executive battery. Our intention was that we would be able tocontrol for general intelligence to some extent using this as a
proxy measure if we found other measures to be predictors.
The BPVS-II [49] is a measure of children’s receptive vocabu-
lary. On each trial, children were presented with four outline
drawings and were asked to point to the picture that corre-
sponded to a target word spoken by the experimenter. Trials
were administered in sets of 12 that increased in difficulty.
Children started with the set that was indicated as being
appropriate for their age. The test was terminated if children suc-
ceeded on only four or fewer trials within a set. The dependent
measure was the total number of correct responses.
(iii) Hook-innovation task
Children were presented with the hook-innovation task with
slight variations compared to Study 1: we did not include a fam-
iliarization phase (Beck et al. [8], Experiment 3, found no
evidence that the familiarization phase affected performance)
and children were presented with a range of materials as in pre-
vious versions of the task (e.g. Beck et al. [8], Experiment 2). If
children failed to retrieve the bucket during the 1 min innovation
phase, there followed a two-stage demonstration phase as used
by Cutting et al. [44]. Children first saw a premade hook. If
they then failed to solve the task after a further 30 s the exper-
imenter showed them the manufacturing demonstration. As
our interest here is in innovation, not social learning, we do
not report on children’s performance following the demon-
strations. The dependent measure used was whether children
solved the task in the first minute.
(iv) Executive function tasks3
The executive function tasks were presented on a 17 inch screen
laptop using E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools Inc.). For
the ‘Eyes’ and ‘Pictures’ tasks children made responses using
two custom-built button boxes. The top faces of the boxes were
12  14 cm and they had a depth of 3.5 cm at the back sloping to
2.5 cm at the front. A circular plastic button (diameter 2.5 cm)
was present on the top of each box. On the left-hand box, this
button was blue and on the right-hand box this button was
green. Responses in the counting recall task were made verbally.
All tasks had a pseudorandom trial order to ensure that all children
had a very similar experience. There were equal numbers of con-
gruent and incongruent trials in the pictures and eyes tasks, and
equal numbers of switch and non-switch trials in the eyes task.
The pictures and eyes tasks had similar training procedures,
where after receiving instructions children received four practice
trials with feedback. Children were required to succeed on three
out of four practice trials to proceed to the main task. If children
did not reach this threshold they received additional sets of four
trials until the criterion was reached. The maximum iteration
that any child required was two sets.
Pictures task. The pictures task is a spatial Simon task that
gives a measure of inhibitory control. Children were first pre-
sented with two pictures (a monkey and a cat) that were
paired with the two response buttons positioned in front of the
participant. Children were instructed to press the left-hand
(blue) button when they saw the cat and the right-hand (green)
button when they saw the monkey. A small picture of each
stimulus printed onto card was placed above the relevant
response button so as to reduce memory demands. There were
20 trials, in each of which either a cat or a monkey picture was
presented in a pseudorandom order on either the left-hand side
or right-hand side of the computer screen. Half of the trials
required a congruent response, such that the stimulus was pre-
sented at the same side as the response button, and half of trials
were incongruent, meaning that the picture was presented at the
other side to the response button. The incongruent trials were
the main source of interest as these allowed measurements of
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response button on the same side as stimulus presentation. Accu-
racy and response times were recorded by the E-PRIME software.
Anticipatory responses, less than 200 ms, were removed prior to
analyses. Responses greater than 2.5 s.d. from the mean were
also removed, as per Davidson et al. [33]. A trade-off between accu-
racy and reaction timewas calculated to give an overall processing
cost for both the congruent and incongruent trial types. This was
calculated by dividing each child’s mean reaction time (ms) by
the proportion of correct responses such that larger scores
represented greater processing costs. Themeasure of simple inhibi-
tory control used in subsequent correlational analyses was
determined by the processing costs for the incongruent trials in
comparison to the congruent trials that did not require inhibition.
Counting recall. The counting recall task measured children’s
verbal working memory. On each trial, children were presented
with an array of red dots and blue squares and were instructed
to count the red dots. Arrays contained between four and
seven red dots. The array then disappeared and children were
asked to recall verbally how many red dots they had counted.
Children began by recalling one screen at a time, and succeeded
in this block if they were correct on at least four out of six trials. If
they reached this threshold, they proceeded to the next block in
which each trial consisted of recalling the numbers of dots
in two arrays, then three arrays and so on up to a maximum of
five. Each block consisted of six trials, and children needed to
achieve four trials correctly to proceed; if children got the first
four trials correct they proceeded automatically and were cred-
ited as achieving all six correctly. The test was terminated
when children were incorrect on three trials within a single
block or they had completed all of the available trials. The total
number of correct trials was calculated as the dependent measure
of working memory. Children received four warm-up trials with
feedback prior to starting the task. Two of the warm-up trials
had one array and two contained two arrays.
Eyes task. The eyes task has both inhibitory and task switching
demands. The stimuli in the task were faces presented on the
laptop screen. Faces could be presented on either side of the
screen and had eyes that looked either straight downwards or
diagonally downwards and across at a 458 angle. Children were
instructed to press the button the eyes were looking towards.
When the eyes looked downwards the correct response was con-
gruent with the side of the screen where the face was presented.
When the eyes looked across the screen the responsewas incongru-
ent with the position the face was presented. To succeed on this
task, children must learn two rules: when the eyes are looking
downwards they must press the button on the same side as the
stimulus, and when the eyes are looking across they must press
the button on the opposite side. Burns et al. [15] found local
switch costs indicating that children treated these as two separate
rules and did not combine them in to one simpler rule, i.e. press
where the eyes are looking. Children received three blocks of 20
trials; the first block contained all eyes looking downwards, the
second block was all eyes looking diagonally, and the third
block was a mixture of downwards and diagonal trials.
Three measures were obtained from the eyes task: complex
inhibition, local switch cost and global switch cost. The complex
inhibition measure was obtained using the same method as the
simple inhibition measure outlined in the pictures task, and pro-
vided a measure of the processing cost involved in responding to
incongruent trials in comparison with congruent trials in the
mixed block. In the eyes task, this is termed complex inhibition
owing to the increased working memory demands, as unlike in
the pictures simple inhibition task there is not a simple mapping
between one stimulus and one response. Local switch cost refers
to children’s ability to switch between different rules within the
mixed trial block, that is switching between eyes downwards and
eyes downward and across trials. The local switch cost measureis calculated by comparing performance on switch versus non-
switch trials within the mixed block. As for the inhibition
measures, a processing cost was produced by dividing accuracy
on each of the trial types by the proportion of correct trials. The
difference between the processing costs for switch and non-
switch trials was used as a measure of local switch cost. Global
switch cost refers to the cost to children’s performance in the
mixed block when they know that they might have to switch
between rules relative to performance in the congruent or incon-
gruent blocks where no switching is required. Global switch cost
was calculated by comparing processing costs for congruent
trials that follow congruent trials in the mixed block to congruent
trials following congruent trials in the congruent block, and simi-
lar for incongruent trials. An average of these two differences
was then used as the global switch cost measure.7. Results and discussion
(a) Gender differences
Therewere no gender differences on anymeasures. The results
nearest to significance were for global switch, t21.51 ¼ 21.93,
p ¼ 0.066 (boys M ¼ 2348.30, s.d. ¼ 578.53; girls M ¼ 308.85,
s.d. ¼ 1351.83), simple inhibition, t22.43 ¼ 21.87, p ¼ 0.074
(boys M ¼ 386.41, s.d. ¼ 433.64; girls M ¼ 824.78, s.d.¼
923.44) and age, t41 ¼ 1.77, p ¼ 0.083 (boys M ¼ 91.64, s.d. ¼
6.13; girls M ¼ 88.50, s.d. ¼ 5.10).
(b) Hook-innovation task
On the hook-innovation task, 20 children passed the task
without any demonstration. Nineteen children succeeded after
seeing the endstate demonstration and the remaining four
children passed after having seen the action demonstration.
(c) Executive function measures
We report descriptive data for all tasks, confirmatory analyses
that the executive function tasks were performing as
expected, and correlations between measures in the electronic
supplementary material.
(d) Individual differences analysis
We conducted a binary logistic regression to predict success or
failure on the hook-innovation task. The following measures
were entered in to the analysis: age (in months), gender, recep-
tive vocabulary (BPVS), Six Parts score, simple inhibition
(pictures task), working memory (counting recall) and local
switch costs (eyes task; table 2). BPVS was the only signifi-
cant predictor of hook-innovation, x2ð1Þ ¼ 4:60, p ¼ 0.032, and
gender approached significance x2ð1Þ ¼ 2:98, p ¼ 0.084. The
average raw BPVS score of those childrenwho solved the inno-
vation task was 74.50 (s.d. ¼ 11.86) and of those who did not
solve it was 64.61 (s.d. ¼ 10.63). 61% of girls solved the
hook-innovation task and 36% of boys. None of the executive
function measures made a significant contribution to the
regression model and overall the model appeared a poor fit
to the data (Cox & Snell R2 ¼ 0.267). Our model predicted
82.6% of those who failed the task, but only 65% of those
who passed.4
Overall, there was no evidence that children’s innovation
success was related to their executive function. On the other
hand, there was a relationship between innovation and recep-
tive vocabulary, which may indicate a role for general
Table 2. Binary logistic regression predicting success on hook-innovation task from executive function measures.
predictor B s.e. Wald d.f. p-value odds ratio
age 0.02 0.08 0.08 1 0.777 1.02
gender 1.56 0.90 2.98 1 0.084 4.735
BPVS 0.08 0.04 4.60 1 0.032 1.09
Six Parts score 20.14 0.10 1.95 1 0.162 0.87
simple inhibition .0.01 .0.01 0.21 1 0.650 1.00
working memory 0.08 0.16 0.24 1 0.628 1.08
local switch ,0.01 ,0.01 ,0.01 1 0.988 1.00
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children’s developing innovation.371:201501908. General discussion
Around half of 5–8-year-olds solved a hook-innovation task in
previous studies: innovation success was remarkably variable
in this age group. Neither age nor gender explained this vari-
ation in the emergence of tool-making innovation and so we
looked to personal characteristics. Considering the demands
of the tool-making task, we made two predictions: that inno-
vation may be driven by the ability to generate multiple
ideas and that innovation might be reliant on executive func-
tion abilities. We examined the first possibility using two
divergent thinking tasks, one of which focused on objects.
Although performance on the two divergent thinking tasks
was related, we could not predict tool-making success based
on these scores. In the second study,we used a batteryof execu-
tive function tasks. This battery included relatively simple
executive processes (inhibition, working memory, attentional
flexibility) and the more complex ill-structured problem-
solving. Once again, there were correlations between executive
measures (although not with ill-structured problem-solving),
yet none of the executive measures predicted success on the
hook-innovation task.
One concern is that our samples of children were relatively
small. However, in both studies there were sufficient children
to find significant correlations between other measures. Fur-
thermore, there was no hint of any relationship between our
innovation measure and the divergent thinking and executive
measures we used. Although we are cautious in our interpret-
ation of a lack of relations, our results suggest that a simple
explanation for children’s difficulty in innovating that impli-
cates divergent thinking or executive function is unlikely to
be correct. Studies with larger sample sizes would confirm
our preliminary claims, but we also believe that care should
be taken before embarking on a large individual differences
study of innovation in young children, given the lack of
relations with specific personal characteristics that we found
in our two studies.
One measure did predict innovation success: children
who successfully made a hook in Study 2 scored more
highly on the BPVS, a measure of receptive vocabulary. It
seems unlikely that the problem-solving aspect of the inno-
vation task makes specific demands on language ability as
it is a largely non-verbal task. Yet, one possibility is that chil-
dren with better comprehension (assumed to be related toother language measures) interpret the instructions or
encouragement differently from those with weaker language
and thus perform better on the task. However, levels of suc-
cess are comparable across versions of the task in which
children have been given more explicit verbal instructions
(to ‘make something’ [21]) and non-verbal demonstrations
of manipulating the materials [8] or solving a different task
[21]. We suspect that the most probable explanation for this
relation is that the BPVS is a proxy here for a general intelli-
gence. Similar arguments have been made by Beck et al. [51]
and O’Connor et al. [52].
One possibility is that the predictor of innovation success is
general intelligence itself. Side-stepping the debate of whether
such a construct even exists, one reason this does not seem
right is that if tool innovation reflects primarily general intelli-
gence then we should expect it to correlate with more of the
other measures, at the very least those that also correlated
with the BPVS measure: i.e. age and complex inhibition. Yet
the possibility that innovation is driven by general intellectual
ability is not incompatible with our results. Recently,
Muthukrishna et al. [53] reported that IQ was negatively related
to social learning in human adults, which, if our study did
suggest a link between innovation and general intellect, is in
line with the possibility that innovation is a complement to
social learning (i.e. one is an individual learner or a social lear-
ner). However, their further finding that both those with low
and high (relative to mid) IQ showed more conformity bias
suggested perhaps that high IQ individuals are selective in
when they use social information. High IQ individuals may be
using both innovation and social learning (see Reader [54] for
evidence that innovation and social learning are related). Despite
this, the Muthukrishna et al. [53] study raises the same question
as our own: is it general IQ that supports social learning in their
case or innovation in ours, or is the IQmeasure (Raven’smatrices
in Muthukrishna et al. [53] and BPVS in our study) reflecting
another specific cognitive measure?
The idea that a relationship between innovation and gen-
eral IQ is in fact masking a more specific relationship would
mean that there is another personal characteristic that we
have yet to identify. This would be a rather unsatisfactory
conclusion to this paper, but perhaps we can suggest some
likely candidates. We predicted that divergent thinking and
executive functions would relate to the emergence of inno-
vation. Yet, it may be that a different cognitive process is
related to innovation (that also relates to general IQ). One
possibility is that children’s analogical reasoning, their ability
to identify similarities between problems and bring relevant
information to bear, might be at the heart of innovation
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cal reasoning undergoes a qualitative shift at around 5 years
of age, which maps remarkably well on to the changes
reported in children’s innovation.
Second, it is possible that a personality trait (in the tra-
ditional psychological sense) might be involved. Certainly,
research with adults has suggested some (e.g. openness)
that might be related to innovation, e.g. [13]. Individual
differences research in cognitive development has not
tended to focus on the role of personality traits to the same
extent as it has cognitive abilities (such as executive function)
and it is not clear that a personality trait would be closely
related to BPVS score or intelligence. The story is likely to
be further complicated by the developmental trajectories of
such traits, but research suggests that although consistency
of personality traits increases across the lifespan (to a peak
after age 50) there is at least some consistency in childhood
and that there are robust measures of childhood traits [57].
In the future, further individual differences studies should
compare performance on innovation to personality traits
and other cognitive abilities. But to prevent this becoming a
wild goose chase, it will be important to base the choice
of measures on our understanding of both innovation
and development.
Third, it may be that domain-specific knowledge, rather
than a domain general ability is key to understanding the
emergence of innovation. Osuirak’s theory of human tool
use emphasizes the role of technical reasoning, which rests
on technical information (‘laws’) being derived from
experience with the world [58]. This could lead to the interest-
ing prediction that those children who have more experience
interacting with objects should develop the relevant technical
knowledge earlier and go on to innovate. There may be
potential to manipulate experience with objects experimen-
tally. Another route would be to further explore cross-
cultural differences. Nielsen et al.’s study [23] showed us
that young Bushman children were as unlikely to innovate
hooks as urban Australians. However, there may be differ-
ences in the rate at which children succeed on this task,
depending on the opportunities they have to develop their
technical reasoning.
It is important not to overlook a different possibility: that
perhaps, in human children at least, personal characteristics
do not predict innovative behaviour, indeed, that we are
wrong to try to identify some children as innovators. That
innovative behaviour is entirely random is undermined by
both the general developmental evidence that there are
gross changes with age, and the specific finding here that
BPVS scores predicted innovative behaviour. Perhaps inno-
vation is possible once a certain threshold of intelligence is
reached (see Simonton [10] for discussion), yet once this is
reached innovation may result from external rather than
internal influences. If it is misplaced to seek child innovators,the question remains whether there are adult innovators.
It is possible that even if the opportunity for innovation is
largely randomly distributed, perhaps those lucky indivi-
duals who have a positive experience of it might then be
highly motivated to seek out further opportunities, or
are encouraged to take risks, or become more open to
unconventional possibilities providing good solutions. A
developmental approach is thus essential if we are to under-
stand whether innovative ability can be predicted, at least in
part, by personal characteristics, or whether the experience
of successful, but random, innovation perpetuates itself,
regardless of personal characteristics.
It is clear that we do not yet have the answer to why
some children solve innovation tasks and others do not.
Indeed, we may now also be worried about whether
there even are innovators. However, it is clear that an inter-
disciplinary approach to innovation is needed and
understanding the role of development and experience will
be critical contributions.
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